The discussion so far has examined in detail the border transformations that have occurred due to the EU's regime regulating the movement of people. These developments, however, have impacted on another crucial area with border-transforming repercussions: social insurance. It is part of social policy and played a crucial role in the establishment of the modernera nation state. Therefore, an in-depth understanding of the transformation of EU borders and the Commission's contribution to this process needs to scrutinize the bordering practices associated with social policy and, more specifi cally, the issues around the provision of social insurance. This endeavour also builds on the long-held view that there is a unique European model of organizing social relations and is further supported by the social aims of the integration effort as stated in consecutive EU treaties, going back to the Treaty of Rome. These suggest that EU social systems will display certain characteristics, making it relatively easy to differentiate the societies that have them and those which do not. In turn, this implies that there should be a clear border between these two categories. Social issues and their repercussions for bordering practices are all the more pertinent in the post-2008 context. It witnessed the onset of the sovereign debt crisis in many member states, especially of the eurozone, the Union economic downturn and the associated protests across the EU against some of the measures taken for tackling the budget defi cits and national debts.
Against this background this chapter focuses specifi cally on scrutinizing the key features of the borders articulated in the Commission social policy discourse and analysing what this means for their nature. Also, specifi c attention will be paid to the Commission's contribution to the border transformations prompted by social policy developments. To that end, the next section provides a background to the following discussion outlining the evolution and governance structure of EU social policy. Section two then conducts the fi rst reading, demonstrating the key ways in which Commission articulations contribute to de-bordering. Section three engages with this discourse critically, showing how it constructs and reconstructs borders. The chapter concludes summarizing the key points.
THE EU SOCIAL DIMENSION-EVOLUTION AND GOVERNANCE
This section anchors the subsequent discussion by outlining the main developments in the evolution of EU social policy, its governing structure and the Commission's role in it. It highlights some of the key controversies and major arguments with a bearing on the following sections. Before this, however, it briefl y points to the role the welfare state played in the onset of the nation state as the organizing unit of domestic and international politics. Contemporary social policy encompasses a broad array of issues from social welfare to employment activation. Furthermore, as the subsequent discussion shows with reference to the EU, over time there have been important alterations in its goals and instruments. Nevertheless, one of its main elements has traditionally been social insurance. According to Ferrera, it is the historical core of social policy and comprises of compulsory public insurance schemes that constitute the main pillars of national welfare ( 2005b : 232) .
Crucially, this welfare state played an important role in the creation of the modern nation state. Firstly, compulsory insurance schemes locked entire segments of the population in redistributive programmes (simultaneously keeping out those who do not qualify), while at the same time developing further and concentrating at the centre the state's administrative and fi scal resources. Ultimately, this led to greater uniformity within a state and ironed out territorial diversity in institutional structures and practices (Ferrera 2005a : 169-70) . Thus, social insurance schemes contributed decisively to the bounding of territory, facilitating the establishment of territoriality as a key element of state sovereignty.
Secondly, the rights and duties conferred to citizens under social insurance schemes were crucial for the emergence and embedding of national identity. More specifi cally, these programmes pooled risks like old age, sickness or disability. The successful pulling off of such policies depended on and forged further the sense of solidarity between the citizens of a particular state (Ferrera 2005b : 226) . It is possible only if the population shares an understanding of itself as 'we'. As Mau puts it: 'The emotional force of nationhood and the feelings of belonging and mutuality it engenders contribute greatly to the collectivization of social risks ' ( 2005 : 208) . In other words, it is the unifying feeling of national identity between citizens that enables the welfare state to provide communal goods and services, while allowing members to make a claim on societal resources. Unsurprisingly, with the establishment of the welfare state, redistributive issues came to the fore, sharpening societal cleavages, above all along class divisions. In turn, this shaped the development of citizenship in important ways, impacting the institutions and procedures of the emerging democratic process in Europe. That is why, according to Marshall, the extension of social rights was as important for the development of social citizenship as that of civil and political rights (cited in Ferrera 2005b : 227) . These struggles and the settlements reached helped strengthen the legitimacy of the state and its institutions, as for many it was the bearer and guarantor of the solidarity (Mau 2005 : 208) , underpinning the welfare state.
All in all, the onset of the welfare state in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries contributed greatly to the state's ability to act as a container, reinforcing the principle of territoriality and establishing highly visible and diffi cult-to-cross functional and identity borders. In light of this, changes to the regime for movement of people, discussed in the previous chapters, are to be expected to have implications for the national welfare states and by extension on social policy. This puts the issue of EU social policy provisions in the limelight, as it can highlight important aspects of the process of borders transformation. Taking this matter on, the rest of the section outlines the key points in the evolution and governance of EU social policy.
Indeed, EU treaties articulate social goals for the integration project, indicating a concern with these matters and demonstrating their importance for the endeavour. For example, the Preamble of the Treaty of Rome affi rms the objective of improving the living and working conditions of the populations of the member states and expresses a resolution to ensure their social progress. More recently, Article 9 of the ToL, refers to the promotion of high levels of employment, the guarantee of adequate social protection and the fi ght against social exclusion. Such goals constitute the so-called 'social dimension' of European integration. According to Lange, it consists of: 'all those policies, or proposed policies, for the EC and its member states that provide or would provide rights, opportunities, benefi ts, or protections to actual, potential, or former participants in the labour market ' ( 1992 : 229-30) . Nevertheless, the EU's record in the fi eld of social policy is uneven and at times controversial.
From the outset, the key policy goals have been social progress within a competitive social market economy; economic, social and territorial cohesion; and solidarity among member states (based on Andor 2013e : 9). The key social provisions of the Treaty of Rome were focused on labour market mobility and over the next few decades triggered successive ECJ decisions that gradually changed the EU regime for movement of people for work purposes. As discussed in Chap. 3 , this contributed to the transformation of functional borders. The other signifi cant social policy development in the early years of integration, conducive to addressing the issue of territorial cohesion, was the establishment of the European Regional Development Fund. However, on the whole, not only were the achievements in the area modest (at best), but also the member states remained the most important players in it. Consequently, as Ross states, any Commission role was rendered very diffi cult ( 1995 : 359) .
The SEA provisions allowed for some important changes, predominantly in areas affected by market liberalization. The alterations to the social policy fi eld emanated from their relevance for addressing economic objectives, which is in tune with functional spillover (as stated for example by George 1991 : 216) . Overall, however, continuing with the trend from the previous period, national governments were reluctant to broaden the Community role in the social fi eld. The important exception was the provision for QMV in the CoM on matters concerning the health and safety of workers. This enabled the Commission to play a more prominent role in regulating the minimum standards applicable in the member states on these issues. Crucially, as Cram has argued, this allowed the Commission to push for greater Community role in social policy and established regulation as one of the key tools in its box for attaining this expansion ( 1993 ) .
The new Commission President, Jacques Delors, however, had a more ambitious social policy agenda and, as demonstrated by Ross, his two terms left a signifi cant legacy. Firstly, through the reform of the Structural Funds, substantial EU resources (especially for the budgets of some member states) were devoted to regional redistribution aiming to level out the Union's economic and social cohesion. Secondly, in 1989, the Social Charter providing for Community legislation (a 'hard' policy tool) on matters like worker information, participation, consultation or equal treatment was adopted. Thirdly, efforts towards establishment of EU-level social dialogue were made, resulting in launching the so-called Val Duchesse process (Ross 1995 for more details).
These controversial measures were in tune with the ideas of the socalled social protectionists, who favoured greater scope for Community responsibilities, which would entail harmonization of national standards (Lange 1992 : 231) . This approach, however, was not particularly successful overall. As Ross states, the hard regulatory legislation actually produced was modest-unsurprising given the limited Community mandate and the legacies in the social policy fi eld ( 1995 : 375) . Developments in the early 1990s turned the tide further in favour of the supporters of a minimalist, decentralized, hands-off approach, advocating limiting the Communitylevel legislation and giving more space to member states (Lange 1992 : 230) .
In turn, this marked an important shift in the social dimension. It moved the emphasis away from work and solidarity, which used to be the key concerns of policy undertakings, to a broader conception of social policy interested in issues beyond labour law and the defence of the rights of those in employment (Santer 1996 : 2; Flynn 1995b : 2) . Instead, the dominant view became that social policy: 'must also look to the problems of the unemployed, the socially excluded, the disabled and other disadvantaged groups in society, and the growing problems faced by our welfare states' (Flynn 1995b : 2) .
The new paradigm highlights the interrelationship between economic and social policies and conceives of them as the two parts of a whole. It signals a change in EU social policy from a more social protectionist approach to a more decentralized one. Discursively, this is articulated by the advancement of a new phrase encapsulating the ambitions of the social dimension, the European Social Model (ESM), which replaces the earlier one, the European model of society (EMoS) (Delors and Clisthene 1992 : 157-8; Santer 1995 Santer : 1, 1996 : 2 exemplify the use of these phrases by Commission offi cials). The early Commission documents that encapsulate this new thinking are the Paper on Growth, Competitiveness and Employment (European Commission Communication 1993c ), the Green Paper on Social Policy (European Commission Communication 1993b ) and the White Paper on Social Policy (European Commission Communication 1994 ) . In this atmosphere of structural changes and fundamental differences were negotiated the new terms of European integration, the Treaty of Maastricht. According to Ferrera: 'Delors' ambitions regarding the social dimension were basically defeated by the 1992 constitutional revision', despite his previous social policy achievements and formidable overall standing within the politics of European integration ( 2005a : 117) .
Although the Maastricht Treaty incorporated into primary legislation the provisions of the Social Charter and extended QMV to areas like the information and consultation of workers, this was done in the so-called Social Chapter, a Social Policy Protocol annexed to the Treaty. It granted an opt-out from this legislation to the UK, which was categorically opposed to accepting such social policy measures. Thus, after the Treaty of Maastricht, two social policy provisions operated in the EU. The Social Chapter covered all member states minus the UK, while the provisions of the SEA applied to all member states.
This division ended in 1997 after the new British government adopted the Social Chapter. The other important innovation introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam was the adoption of a new tool for achieving social policy goals, the so-called OMC. It was fi rst applied under the European Employment Strategy and has subsequently been used in the attainment of social policy goals, like social inclusion under the Social Policy Agenda. It involves fi xing guidelines at Union level and agreeing upon timetables for achieving short-, medium-and long-term goals; establishing qualitative and quantitative indicators and benchmarks; translating the European guidelines into national and regional policies; and periodic monitoring, evaluation and peer review organized as a mutual learning process (for studies on the OMC, cf. Mosher and Trubek 2003 ; Daly 2006 ; Adnett 2001 ; Heidenreich and Bischoff 2008 ) . Although EU offi cials, including Commission staff, have praised it (cf. Diamantopoulou 2001a : 4), it remains a 'soft' policy tool under which the Commission does not have enforcement prerogatives.
The most recent amendments under the ToL provide for extending QMV to the matter of social security provision for migrant workers and include the Charter for Fundamental Rights of the Union into the treaty framework. This strengthening of EU social policy competence is balanced, however, by new safeguard procedures that could strengthen the member states' control over their social security systems in the future (based on Falkner 2010 : 276-81; for further details, see also Dinan 2005 , esp. ch. 14; Falkner 2003 ; Hix and Høyland 2011 : 206-9; or Nugent 2010 : 340-3) . Thus, overall, this treaty does not break with the established pattern in social policy integration.
This discussion of the key developments in the evolution of EU social policy has highlighted the major controversies it has spawned. They revolve fi rstly around disagreements about the appropriate shape and form of EU social policy with some in favour of greater EU-level harmonization, while others advocate a more decentralized settlement that limits supranational involvement. As we have seen, since the early 1990s, the latter has been the dominant view. Secondly, and interrelatedly, there has been disagreement over the role of the Commission in this policy area. On the whole, its role in the governance of EU social policy has been limited. The Commission had important successes, especially in the years following the adoption of the SEA when it pursued deeper integration in the fi eld through supranational legal harmonization of social provisions. Also, regulation became an important tool at the Commission's disposal in areas like workers' health and safety. Nevertheless, on the whole, member states have guarded their sovereignty on social policy issues, signifi cantly limiting the Commission's ability to propose measures developing the input at the supranational level. The manifestation of this in terms of policy tools has been the OMC, which precludes the adoption of binding measures on the member states.
As a result of the distinctive evolution and substance of EU social policy cooperation, compared to states, the Union displays signifi cant absences in this fi eld. Arguably, chief amongst them is its inability to provide social insurance to its citizens directly. As Ferrera puts it: 'The European Union certainly does not have (and perhaps will never have) its own social protection budget, fed by autonomous taxing powers, through which direct interpersonal fl ows of redistributions can be fi nanced ' ( 2005b : 237) . This is a crucial issue, given that as shown above, social transfers are the core of social policy and have contributed decisively to the establishment of the modern order. Therefore, the social policy situation in the EU also implies that the Commission's contribution to borders transformation through articulations on this matter is likely to be limited.
Nevertheless, as Leibfried ( 2015 ) and Ferrera ( 2005a , b ) have shown, the EU has had important repercussions on the national welfare state, albeit an indirect one. More specifi cally, such studies highlight how the pursuit of economic goals under the single market banner have spilled over into the national domain of the welfare state, increasingly constraining individual governments' social policy options. Decisions of the ECJ have played a very prominent role in this process. These developments have resulted in signifi cant changes in the spatial architecture of social citizenship for EU nationals, for example, altering the particular social protection schemes available or the categories of people benefi ting from certain provisions.
This clearly demonstrates the Union's border-transforming potential, even if it does not come about as a result of direct social policy undertakings of the supranational institutions, like the Commission. Instead, as Scharpf has argued convincingly, such transformations are due to a structural asymmetry in the design of the European integration process, skewing it to privilege economic cooperation at the expense of social policy provisions ( 2002 , 2010 ) . Arguably, the outcome of these developments is the gradual erosion of national welfare states through the imposition of important limitations 'to the social sovereignty of domestic welfare states' (Ferrera 2005b : 231) .
So, overall, integration impacts social policy, a development with a border-transforming potential. Simultaneously, as the above points indicate, this tends to come about through indirect erosion of national welfare provisions, accompanied by a lack of development of such provisions at EU level. Furthermore, the Commission is likely to be restricted in its possible contributions to EU social policy, making future Union provisions also unlikely. This makes an examination of the bordering repercussions of the Commission social policy discourse an intriguing endeavour. The rest of the chapter undertakes it, starting with a reconstruction of the discourse under the fi rst reading.
DE-BORDERING-CREATING A COMMON EU SOCIAL SPACE
Despite what one might expect in light of the above discussion, in continuation of the trend noted in the previous chapters, at face value the Commission social policy discourse promotes the emergence of a common EU space, thus contributing to de-bordering. As elaborated on below, the main ways in which this is articulated is through downplaying the differences between the social orders of the Union's members and using inclusive words, such as the pronouns 'our', 'ours' and 'we'. In distinction to the policies discussed previously, the promotion of mobility or freedom does not feature prominently in the Commission's social policy articulations. Certain enunciations on the Eastern enlargement process and on the measures undertaken to tackle the post-2008 EU economic problems suggest the importance attached to social policy matters further. This section presents all these points in detail after fi rstly briefl y sketching out the main tenets of Commission thinking on this policy area.
As pointed out above, one of the key aims of the integration project has been the establishment of a social market economy. A former European Commissioner, responsible for employment, social affairs and inclusion, highlights the following as the main features of a social market economy: an economy that harnesses competition to keep prices down and generate growth and innovation; that has rules to eliminate distortion; that has a social dimension; and that is concerned with sustainability (Andor 2013c : 3) . This bestows upon the social dimension a central role in the integration endeavour. For example, according to the Commission 1991 Programme: 'the social dimension … must move ahead at the same time as the economic dimension' (European Commission 1991 : 1). A more recent enunciation states that the common market programme: 'was a balancing act between the market and the social dimension' (Andor 2011c : 3) . Arguably, these articulate equal weight of the economic and the social dimension in the integration project.
This understanding of the role and signifi cance of the social dimension is underpinned by the above-mentioned belief in the existence of a European model for organizing societal relations. Although, as explained above, the phrase denoting this has changed over time from EMoS to ESM, arguably both share a belief in the necessity of extensive social protection systems, strong policies to promote social cohesion, well-developed health and education systems or the importance of the social dialogue.
1 This is because, according to Delors in the EU: 'people feel that a society should not be allowed to crush the individual; but individuality should not be taken so far as to undermine society' (cited in European Commission Press Release 1986 : 2). So, how has the Commission contributed to ensuring the preservation and implementation of these features, core to EU societies and the integration process?
To address this question, key provisions of several Commission Communications are outlined. Inevitably, given the vast amount of relevant documentation, they do not enable a detailed presentation of Commission articulations on all possible social policy issues. Nevertheless, they allow summarizing succinctly the main goals and areas under EU action in the social policy fi eld since the late 1990s. During this time two strategies have dominated in articulating EU thinking in the economic and social areas, the Lisbon Agenda and Europe 2020. Within this framework, the communications discussed here outline well the Commission thinking on social policy matters and indicate the areas of major undertakings. Therefore, arguably, these communications will illustrate suffi ciently the major Commission contributions to EU social policy, enabling subsequently a detailed interpretation of the bordering transformations they promote.
One of these communications was an integral part of achieving the strategic aims of the Lisbon agenda, making the Union: ' the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion ' by 2010 (Presidency Conclusions 2000 : 1, original emphasis). To that end, the Commission advocated positive and dynamic interaction between economic, employment and social policy (European Commission Communication 2000 : 2). More specifi cally, to achieve this, according to the Commission, it was necessary to extend the notion, already familiar in the business world, of quality to the whole of the economy and society as this would help improve the interrelationship between economic and social policies. A key message of this approach is that growth is not an end in itself but merely a means to achieving a better standard of living for all. Furthermore, social policy underpins economic policy and employment and has a social value as well as an economic one. As a result, the attainment of a thriving economy was foreseen through the creation of more and better jobs and of an inclusive society. The specifi c social policy undertakings deemed necessary for the attainment of these objectives were promotion of strong partnerships; establishment of dialogue and facilitation of participation at all levels; access to good services and care; and adapting social protection to the economic and societal changes (European Commission Communication 2000 : 13) . A number of specifi c actions are then outlined showing how each of these will be pursued (European Commission Communication 2000 : 15-24 for more details). Among the key tools to be used, the Commission lists the OMC, legislation, the social dialogue and the fi nancial resources available under the Structural Funds, particularly the European Social Fund (European Commission Communication 2000 : 14) .
Even before the onset of the economic downturn precipitated by the 2008 fi nancial crisis, however, in the Commission's own words, the record in attaining the Lisbon strategy goals 'has at best been mixed' (European Commission Communication 2005c : 3) . One of the main responses in the social policy fi eld was a communication adopted just before the start of the fi nancial crisis in earnest in 2008. It aimed at reinvigorating the EU's social policy actions, enabling it to keep pace with the changing realities (European Commission Communication 2008 : 2) . The specifi c provisions of this communication (European Commission Communication 2008 ) and the social policy goals articulated by the Commission in its Europe 2020 communication show that, overall, the key social policy ideas remained the same. In concurrence with the established thinking, the Commission 2020 Communication outlines three main priorities in the economic, social and environmental sustainability fi elds. It makes clear that they are mutually reinforcing, offering a vision for the Europe's social market economy of the twenty-fi rst century (European Commission Communication 2010a : 8). The overall social policy goals within this framework are to deliver high employment and social and territorial cohesion through investing in skills; fi ghting poverty; modernizing social markets, training and social protection; and ensuring access and opportunities for all throughout the lifecycle. The specifi c measures foreseen for attaining these aims revolve around steps for strengthening and modernizing EU employment, education and training policies, and its social protection systems; increasing labour participation; and reducing structural unemployment. A key principle underpinning these undertakings is 'fl exicurity' (European Commission Communication 2008 : 16) .
This concept emerged in the wake of the early 1990s shift in social policy thinking. It denotes the understanding that robust and active labour market policies, lifelong learning investment and modern social security systems can ensure security of employment and income, even if, due to the rapidly evolving economic context, contractual arrangements become more fl exible and job transitions more frequent (Andor 2011a : 4) . According to the Commission, fl exicurity is key for enabling people to acquire new skills and to adapt to the shifting conditions and potential need for career changes (European Commission Communication 2010a : 16). The innovation under the Europe 2020 strategy was the enunciation of the so-called Flagship Initiatives for its three priority areas. For inclusive growth, these are the Agenda for New Skills and Jobs and the European Platform against Poverty. They outline the key goals and steps to be undertaken towards the attainment of inclusive growth at both EU and national levels (European Commission Communication 2010a : 16-18 for more details). So, on the whole, there has been stability and continuity in the Commission social policy thinking, even if meeting the relevant EU strategic goals has faced signifi cant diffi culties. With these key points in mind, the attention can now turn to analysing the border transformations that the Commission's social policy articulations promote. This builds on a broader number of documents that illuminate further the Commission's views on the social dimension.
Overall, the Commission articulations promote the idea that a common EU social space exists, thus contributing to de-bordering. This is enunciated in three main ways. Firstly, this is done through downplaying the differences between the social orders of the Union's member states. Despite a growing body of academic literature pointing to the existence of distinctive social models between the EU member states (cf. Arts and Gelissen 2002 ; Ebbinghaus 1999 ) , the Commission's social dimension articulations with their references to a European model imply that whatever the differences between the member states' models, the commonalities between them are more important. For example, a former Commissioner responsible for employment and social affairs states: 'Yes, there is a tremendous diversity within the spectrum of those systems. In the Scandinavian Countries, social protection is a right enjoyed equally by all citizens. In Germany, Austria, Belgium, Holland and Luxembourg, benefi ts are mostly earnings-related… But what I am saying is that one thing stands out: the universal nature and the scope of the social support that European Union governments offer their citizens' (Flynn 1996a : 3) . Similarly, according to the former Commission President Santer: 'over and above our historical and cultural diversity, we do have-from Portugal in the south to Finland in the north-certain shared ways of organizing our societies ' ( 1996 : 2) . Such articulations contribute to the emergence of a common EU social space as by putting the emphasis on the characteristics shared by the member states, they undermine the existing borders between them.
More specifi cally, this is conveyed through the reference to shared values upon which the Union is founded. It is these common values, cherished by all member states 2 that enable achieving unity in diversity. As the former Commission President Prodi declares: 'European integration has always been about people of diverse cultures and languages coming together on the basis of shared values, and acquiring a shared sense of identity' ( 1999 : 2, original emphasis). In the social fi eld: 'the values of society include the idea of mutual solidarity and responsibility, and the need for a safety-net to catch the less fortunate member of society, be it in terms of income support, or of health care' (Brittan 1993 : 3-4) .
De-bordering is also articulated through the claim that in the social fi eld, as well as in the other fi elds related to the construction of the internal market, the Union is facing challenges, which 'are unlikely to be met by any single European State acting alone' (European Commission Communication 1993b : 33) . For the Commission, this creates common objectives, which warrant the efforts to overcome any existing differences and act together. For example, in 1995 Commissioner Flynn argued: 'Europe has tremendous diversity in its systems of social protection, industrial relations and rights, care, education, and training. But the objectives are essentially common. And European social policy has tended, rightly, to emphasize the commonality or convergence of those objectives . That isn't sterile harmonization. It's building on our common interests and strengthening the social dimension of the Union' ( 1995a : 2, emphasis added). This is why the Commission discourse continuously maintains that: 'we need to concentrate on what unites us rather than on what divides us' (Flynn 1997c : 6) .
Secondly the existence of a common EU social space is enunciated in Commission discourse through the usage of inclusive words, such as the pronouns 'our', ours' or 'we', as well as through the labelling of some of the envisaged measures in the social policy fi eld. A good illustration of this is the Preamble of the White Paper on Growth, Competitiveness and Employment, which reads: 'This major challenge confronts us all . That is why we are arguing, fi rst and foremost, the need to press on with building a unifi ed Europe which will increase our strength through cooperation and through the benefi ts of a large area without frontiers of any kind' (European Commission Communication 1993c , emphasis added). Various Commission offi cials in their speeches also use these inclusive pronouns (cf. Almunia 2007 : 6; Diamantopoulou 2002 : 2-4; European Commission Press Release 1986 : 2) . Such articulations facilitate the emergence of feelings of commonality and belonging within the EU population, a 'we-feeling'. This trend is further confi rmed by labelling EU-level undertakings as 'common policy' or 'joint programme'. Crucially, the Commission discourse not only emphasizes inclusiveness, but also points out the distinctive nature of the integration project as an endeavour undertaken by equal partners that participate freely, on their own accord. In the words of the former Commissioner for Employment and Social Affairs Diamantopoulou: 'These common policies, again, are not a matter of one or more countries dictating to others. They are a matter of sovereign states deciding to pursue common objectives for common benefi t ' ( 2000b : 3) .
In distinction to the policies discussed in the previous chapters, the promotion of mobility or freedom does not feature prominently in the Commission's social policy articulations. When such references are made, in concurrence with the above-mentioned interrelation between economic and social matters, the premise of such articulations goes back to the view that in the single market: 'decent standards transcend borders alongside capital, goods, services and people' (Flynn 1996b : 2) . Increasing EU visibility on employment and social issues in this way is sought in order to: 'improve coordination of economic, employment and social policies, ensuring that all EU citizens share in the fruits of growth [;] help to drive better conditions for business and our economies generally and … change people's perception of the EU for the better' (Diamantopoulou 2003 : 3) .
Thirdly, the emergence of a common EU social space is further facilitated by Commission articulations that demonstrate the importance of the social dimension within the overall integration process. In the period under investigation here, this is most evident in statements made on the measures undertaken to tackle the post-2008 EU economic problems and on the Eastern enlargement process. For example, in the context of the Eastern enlargement negotiations, Commissioner Diamantopoulou states that: 'The social model is central to the Union's continued economic progress and to enlargement ' ( 2001d : 3) as 'social policy and the social acquis are not an optional extra-they are a fundamental part of the EU's legislative base and they are fundamental to building a comprehensive and inclusive knowledge economy' (Diamantopoulou 2001c : 6) . Hence: 'the social dimension is a basic element of the process of enlargement, not a casualty of the process' (Diamantopoulou 2000b : 4) .
This implies that during the enlargement process, the East European candidate countries had to make the same efforts in the social policy fi eld as in the sphere of economy or democracy in order to become full EU members. Furthermore, presumably at the time of Union accession, the convergence with the old member states on the social issues should be at the same level as that of the other two areas enlisted above. To achieve this, during the enlargement process, some of the Commission efforts were focused on promoting reform of education, training and tax benefi ts and strengthening the employment services, social partnerships and social dialogue in the applicant countries (as cited in Diamantopoulou 2001c : 4-5) . Hence, the overall result of the enlargement process in the social sphere is expected to be the gradual inclusion of the applicant countries into the ESM, which should more or less be accomplished before full membership becomes a fact. This means that the new member states will become part of the organization of social life in the EU. Thus, the border that used to separate Western and Eastern European societies will no longer be relevant, contributing to de-bordering in the particular area of the social dimension.
In a similar vein, Commission articulations on the 2008 fi nancial crisis convey a commitment to the EU's social dimension and a concern with ensuring the proper balance between economic and social issues in the policy processes. For example, in the immediate aftermath of the 2008 fi nancial crash, Commission articulations maintain that this crisis has highlighted the strength of the ESM and of the EU's joint approach to tackling its social impact by limiting its negative effects on the EU population (European Commission Press Release 2010g : 1; Andor 2010a : 3). This unequivocally confi rms the importance of the social dimension to the integration endeavour at a time when there was likelihood for weakening the political appetite for social measures. Despite this possibility, the Commission discourse demonstrates that it sees the reinforcement of social policy measures, like the strong role for the social partners and a robust social dialogue, as having a crucial part to play in resolving the EU's economic diffi culties (cf. Andor 2010b : 4).
Perhaps even more importantly, during the course of the crisis, after the onset of the sovereign debt crisis, the Commission articulations acknowledge the structural problems created by the lack of a proper economic pillar of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), which necessitates restructuring the EU's economic governance (Andor 2011b : 3) . Furthermore, crucially, they also affi rm that: 'it is equally a necessity to reinforce social cohesion in the EU' (Andor 2011b : 3, emphasis added). This is because according to the Commission: 'There is a link between the functioning of the monetary union, and the sustainability of the European social model' (Andor 2011e : 3) . This clearly articulates the social dimension as a critical part of the integration process. It is based on the view that the EU should develop and implement: 'governance approaches that can simultaneously deliver competitiveness, growth and social cohesion' (Andor 2011e : 3) .
This aspiration was made more concrete a couple of years later, when the Commission adopted a Communication outlining the framework for steering and monitoring the member states' economic and, crucially, social reforms under the European Semester. More specifi cally, the document outlines particular measures aiming: to increase the capacity to monitor EMU employment and social developments; to mobilize EU action and funding to tackle effectively and sustainably unemployment and social distress; to combine the steps undertaken on the economic governance front with more solidarity and fi nancial support; to reduce existing barriers to labour mobility in the EU; and to strengthen the role of the social dialogue in developing EU and national strategies, through the appropriate involvement of the social partners (European Commission Communication 2013a ).
All these articulations not only demonstrate a clear concern with the social dimension, enunciating it as central to the integration endeavour, but also advocate the establishment of a common social space in the EU. In turn, this contributes to the transformation of borders through undermining the previous divisions between the member states. More specifi cally, it was shown that these Commission efforts rely above all on the idea that there are underlying commonalities between the EU peoples, a trait the Commission discourse affi rms and helps embed further. This facilitates strengthening the EU citizens' feeling of belonging to a common endeavour, thus engendering solidarity between them. In turn, this promotes the emergence of a 'we-feeling' within the EU population. Thus, the Commission discourse on the social dimension is conducive to the transformation of identity borders.
Given the different circumstances in which these post-modern identity borders are emerging (in comparison to the ones of the modern nation state), their nature is distinctive in two key, interrelated ways. Firstly, compared to national identity borders, EU ones are less salient. As a result, secondly, they are more fl uid, being less anchored territorially. These characteristics are a consequence of the EU's social dimension. As discussed above, it lacks key features of national welfare policies and, on the whole, the role of the supranational institutions like the Commission is circumscribed. In practice, this means that while the Commission can articulate the existence of a European identity, it is limited in its ability to undertake specifi c measures that impress it fi rmly into the individual psyche. For example, none of the measures articulated under the Commission social policy discourse discussed above are likely to have the far-reaching identity-creation effects of the introduction of the national welfare protection policies at the turn of the twentieth century. Consequently, the EU identity and the borders demarcating it are shallower and, on the whole, their existence is more precarious. This prompts their further reinforcement through articulations that construct borders indirectly. These are revealed through a critical engagement with the discourse, made possible by the second reading of the Commission discourse on the social dimension.
SECOND READING-CONSTRUCTING AND RECONSTRUCTING BORDERS THROUGH THE COMMISSION DISCOURSE ON THE SOCIAL DIMENSION
The 'Self' and the 'Other' in the Commission Social Dimension
Discourse-Constructing EU's External Borders
More specifi cally, the identity constructed by this discourse is reinforced by articulations that demarcate who belongs to the ESM and that clarify their distinctive features. In practice, this draws an identity border between the Europeans (insiders) and the non-Europeans (outsiders). Under the classifi cation outlined in Chap. 1 , this is an external EU border. It transforms traditional identity borders as it aims to transcend national identities, demarcating a division on a different scale. As we saw, some of the distinctive characteristics of the nature of these borders are their greater shallowness and precariousness. Discourse theory allows probing the nature of these borders further by grasping more fully the meaning of the EU identity articulated under the Commission social dimension discourse. To that end, this section examines in detail the Commission enunciations of the 'Self' and the 'Other'. This is the binary opposition, which discourse theorists' argue enables the construction of knowledge, such as what constitutes the substance and limits of being European. The Commission understanding of the 'Other' is revealed by analysing which issues its discourse articulates as a threat and which entities as the ESM's major rivals. In turn, this exposes the understanding of the 'Self' in greater detail.
As the world's biggest economic bloc and due to its economic successes (relatively speaking), one of the strongest and most persistent themes in the Commission social dimension discourse is that the Union is an economic leader. This, therefore, is a central point in the Commission understanding of the EU 'Self'. The following articulations illustrate this well.
Firstly, the Green Paper on Social Policy states: 'The Community is one of the most prosperous areas of the world. While it contains only 7 % of the world's working age population, it produces some 30 % of world's GDP and 45 % of world trade in manufactured goods' (European Commission Communication 1993b : 13) . Consequently, secondly, Commissioner Flynn declares: 'We are the largest, most productive entity in the world ' ( 1997a : 1) . More recently, thirdly, the same sentiment is expressed by maintaining that: 'The European Union as a whole has the biggest economy in the world with 26 % of global GDP, followed by the US with 23 % and China with 9 %' (Barroso 2013 : 9) . These self-perceptions inform the specifi c threats and the key rivals to the ESM, the two main 'Others' articulated under the Commission social dimension discourse, which are analysed in turn in greater detail below.
Starting with the 'Othering' articulated under the banner of danger, the major long-term challenges to the Union singled out by the Commission are globalization, pressures on resources and an ageing population (European Commission Communication 2010a : 3). For example, globalization is an 'Other' as it threatens the EU's competitiveness (cf. Špidla 2006a : 2 or Špidla 2007 : 2) and therefore its potential for economic growth. Consequently, the Commission advocates common actions as the best strategy for addressing the Union's shortcomings and putting it back on the 'upward path of prosperity' (European Commission Communication 2010a : 6). These articulations not only lead to debordering within the EU but also contribute to establishing it as a discrete entity in its own right. A key repercussion from this is the emergence of the external Union border. More specifi cally, the stipulated goal is improving productivity, through Research and Development (R&D), strides in management skills and investment in skills training (Flynn 1993a : 2) . Yet, nearly two decades later, the Commission acknowledges widening of the productivity gap between the EU and its key economic partners (European Commission Communication 2010a : 5) . This suggests that for the time being, the fi rst major 'Other' articulated under the Commission social dimension discourse has not been adequately dealt with.
The second major 'Other' emerging from this discourse is arrived at by considering the actors the EU's performance is compared with. Given the EU's 'Self'-perception, unsurprisingly, these tend to be other leading economies. Crucially, these vary from low-wage economies, like the Chinese, Indian or Asia-Pacifi c ones, to the advanced economies of the USA or Japan as well as from the centralized Soviet economy to the neo-liberal American one. There are inevitably differences in the emphases of the articulations, which illuminate further different aspects of the Commission's understanding of the 'Self'.
More specifi cally, the low wage economies tend to be seen as representing a signifi cant challenge to the EU due to competitiveness attained through lower social protection standards and labour cost. Former Commissioner Flynn likens them to the situation in the nineteenth century in a statement that indicates clearly that the EU would not try to follow suit ( 1993a : 2 and 1995a : 5). Instead, as pointed out above, maintaining productivity levels to ensure EU's competitiveness is sought through measures like R&D or skills training. This articulates the 'Self' as innovative, possessing know-how or having an educated workforce; qualities, which the low wage 'Other' lacks. It is only more recently that some Commission articulations move towards representing the newly-emerging economies in more equal terms, acknowledging the huge strides forward in education and R&D made by the Indians or the Chinese (Mendelson 2005 : 3 or European Commission Communication 2010a : 5-6).
Nevertheless, on the whole, arguably the Commission discourse tends to articulate the emerging economies as inferior. This is indicated by the fact that throughout the period, especially in its earlier decades, EU macroeconomic performance is compared to that of the advanced US and Japanese economies, not to the low-wage ones (cf. European Commission 1992 : 13; European Commission Communication 1993b : 29-30, 1993c Diamantopoulou 2001e : 2; Almunia 2007 : 4) . In 1986, Delors acknowledged that EU's economic diffi culties were: 'constantly being compared with the much more successful performance of the United States and Japan over recent years ' (European Commission Press Release 1986 : 1) . Continuing with this trend, the Europe 2020 strategy compares the Union's macroeconomic data with the same two economic giants (European Commission Communication 2010a : 5). Such comparisons articulate the three players as being on par. Despite that, other Commission enunciations reaffi rm ESM's superiority. For example, former Commissioner Flynn states: 'Europe certainly has a lot to learn from the United States and Japan … but the truth is that there is no model there to follow ' ( 1994a : 3, emphasis added) . This is because their socio-economic systems are seen as having important disadvantages, which discourages the EU from emulating them despite their better overall macroeconomic performance. The Commission articulations on the situation in the neoliberal USA provide further details on these disadvantages. Firstly, this is the great social cost paid by signifi cant parts of the population (Flynn 1995a : 5 for more details). Secondly, although living standards in the USA are higher than even in the richest EU member states, this is achieved not through greater American effi ciency or productivity but simply through longer working hours and most importantly through a higher proportion of the working age population being in work in the USA (Diamantopoulou 2001e : 3) . Lastly, although the USA created more jobs in the 1990s, this did not tackle the issue of the so-called 'working poor' 3 and the resulting social exclusion (Diamantopoulou 2001f : 3) . Consequently, in the USA there are: 'Extremely wide income disparities' (Diamantopoulou 2001f : 3) , a situation obstructing social cohesion (see also Flynn 1994b : 3), a key aim of the social dimension.
Thus, the Commission articulates the EU 'Self ' as rejecting competitiveness that can: 'situate economic health in a social wasteland' (Flynn 1997a : 3) and refusing 'the narrow, selfi sh view of social policy' (Flynn 1997a : 3) . This reaffi rms the more collectivist blueprint for the EU society (Prodi 1999 : 3) with fewer disparities in life opportunities (cf. Flynn 1996c : 3) . Despite this, before the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Commission aimed to steer away from the excessive paternalism of the Soviet socio-economic model, indicating an overall goal of striking a balance and maintaining a unique course for the Union (Flynn 1997a (Flynn : 1, 1998 .
Overall, these Commission articulations construct a unique EU identity, creating a distinctive external border that demarcates insiders from outsiders. These borders and the identity contained within them hinge on the values and ideas of the EU social dimension. Traditional national identities also rely on the values and ideas underpinning a particular socio-economic model. What distinguishes the EU's identity, however, is the lack of deep-seated policies and tools controlled at the Union level that facilitate embedding this identity further into the lives of ordinary citizens. This weakens it, making it potentially more prone to changes. Consequently, the post-modern EU external identity borders are suppler in nature compared to traditional identity borders. Consequently, a potential positive is that they are likely to be more open and adaptable, which can be desirable in the fast-moving world of today. This potential strength, however, is arguably balanced out by the diffi culties such borders are likely to have in meeting the deeply ingrained human need to have a fi rm view of who they are. In turn, this could be conducive to instability, a feature of life that is unlikely to be welcomed. Furthermore, the discussion showed that a crucial way for engendering the existence of a European identity and the borders accompanying it has been the affi rmation of the ESM's superiority (also emphasized in Jepsen and Pascual 2005 : 233) . This self-assuredness has only been toned down during the sovereign debt crisis, for example, by acknowledging the structural weaknesses created by the EMU's design. Nevertheless, the Commission discourse clearly demonstrates that the social dimension is part of the solution of this crisis and therefore advocates: 'reinforcement of our social model' (Andor 2012 : 6) . However, the attainment of the consolidated EU social space, demarcated by clear external borders and characterized by a unique European identity such articulations contribute to, is undermined by certain inconsistencies in the Commission discourse. As the next section discusses in detail, they reconstruct identity borders in the EU.
Reconstructing EU Identity Borders-Inconsistencies in the Commission Social Dimension Discourse
There are two key inconsistencies in the Commission social dimension discourse. Firstly, these are the articulations on the UK enunciating it as an 'internal Other' for the EU. Secondly, this is the privileging of economic considerations over social policy ones in the implementation in practice of policies, like the Eastern enlargement or the measures taken to tackle the sovereign debt crisis. Both of these obstruct the actual creation of the common European social space, articulated by the Commission under the fi rst reading of its documents. More specifi cally, such enunciations undermine the validity of the claims that the social dimension is a central part of the integration process and that there is an ESM to which all member states belong. This weakens the already fragile European identity, questioning the very existence of the external border discussed above and contributing either to the confi rmation of established national identity borders (UK) or to the emergence of factions within the EU (i.e. between old and new members). This transforms identity borders by multiplying them further, often in ways signifi cantly different from their nature under the modern order. More specifi cally, such inconsistencies further the proliferation of diverse identities that have only very weak anchors in specifi c policies that imbed them into people's psyches. At the same time, the prolongation of the existence of national identity borders suggest that in the post-modern order (at least for the time being), transforming borders co-habit with traditional ones, leading to a complex picture when it comes to the nature of these borders. Below, these points are elaborated on, starting with the Commission articulation of the UK as an 'internal Other'. This is enunciated by linking the UK with the USA and 'deregulators' 4 , which both emerge from the Commission social policy discourse as 'Others'. For example, at times, the UK's performance on indicators like income and literacy inequality or the number of hours worked is compared to those of the USA (Diamantopoulou 2001e : 3-4) . Also, the overall strengths and weaknesses of UK's employment and social policies are reminiscent of the American ones (as can be concluded from Diamantopoulou 2000a : 4-5) . Similarly, the Commission documents enunciate deregulation as counterproductive (cf. Diamantopoulou 2001b : 2; Flynn 1997b : 4) , while simultaneously acknowledging the UK's anti-regulatory tradition, especially under Thatcher's government (Flynn 1996d : 1) . These articulations contradict the Commission claim, discussed above, that despite their differences, EU member states' social models share underlying similarity in their overall commitment to the values underpinning the ESM. This creates an ambiguity about the UK's belonging to the ESM, drawing a wedge in the common European social space the Commission aims to establish. This is conducive to the reconstruction of identity borders in the EU as the UK's distinctiveness in comparison to the rest of the Union is reaffi rmed. In turn, this prompts articulations aimed at 'luring' the UK back into EU's social dimension on the grounds that as part of the integration project, it faces much the same challenges as the rest of the Union (Mendelson 2005 : 2; Flynn 1999 : 2, 4) . The UK's track record of opposing EU social policy measures and the outcome of the referendum on the country's membership of the Union suggest that such articulations have been only partially successful at best. In fact, these illustrate well the signifi cant diffi culties in overcoming traditional identity borders when the supranational level has only limited de-bordering tools at its disposal.
The second major inconsistency is that despite the Commission insistence on the centrality of the social dimension to the integration process, presented above, developments under the Eastern enlargement and the measures for addressing the eurozone crisis suggest that economic issues take priority. In the case of the Eastern enlargement, this imbalance was established through the specifi c membership criteria the candidate countries had to fulfi l. According to the Copenhagen Presidency Conclusions, the applicant countries had to satisfy economic and political conditions and to adhere to the aims of political, economic and monetary union ( 1993 ) . This clearly leaves out considerations about the inclusion of the candidate countries into the ESM. This meant that in practice the Commission did not engage signifi cantly with social policy issues during the accession process, resulting in an overall failure 'to drive through a European vision of social policy' (Deacon 2000 : 159) . This was articulated, for example, through prioritizing the economic, administrative and judicial reforms, and the inclusion of the Roma population (Verheugen 2001 : 4) or through a lack of focus of the most signifi cant accessionpreparation tool, the PHARE programme, on social policy issues in the second half of the 1990s (European Commission MEMO 1998 : 2-3) .
The inconsistency between the Commission rhetoric on the signifi cance of the social dimension and the actual measures undertaken in this area during the Eastern enlargement process is laid bare even further if one compares them to the developments in the area of border controls. As a number of academic studies show (cf. Bort 2002 ; Bigo 2002 ; Grabbe 2000 ) , the EU took many concrete steps to ensure the new member states' ability to control the future external border of the Union. This was accompanied by signifi cant EU support ranging from exchange of know-how and practice to fi nancial assistance. This eventually culminated in the gradual full inclusion of most new member states into Schengen and the launch of SIS II.
This instance of a determined effort towards de-bordering shows that despite the enormous fi nancial, administrative and other gaps between old and new EU members, inclusion is achievable. However, unsurprisingly, arguably this has not been the outcome (yet) in the social dimension. Instead, there is a lingering distinction between the old and the new members in the social fi eld, indicating the existence of an internal border in the EU. One manifestation of it is the fact that as late as 2005, long after the decision to enlarge was made, a report on the reform of the European Social Models commissioned by the European Commission refers only to the social models of the old member states. 5 Other manifestations are the persisting differences between old and new member states in their ability to meet social policy targets, even when they are linked to EU funding (de la Porte and Heins 2015 : 22); in practices, like industrial relations (Andor 2013b : 3) ; or the acknowledgement that reducing material deprivation in the new member states is dependent on the implementation of measures for social and territorial cohesion (European Commission MEMO 2009b : 3) . All of these obstruct the emergence of the common European identity articulated under the fi rst reading, contributing instead to the creation of different factions in the social dimension.
The secondary position of the social dimension within the integration project is demonstrated also by comparing the substance of the economic and social measures undertaken in response to the sovereign debt crisis. Although, as indicated above, the Commission has taken specifi c steps towards rebalancing the economic and social parts of the integration project, 6 in practice crucial differences in the approach taken persist. As de la Porte and Heins show, while the economic governance measures contain enforcement provisions, those on the social dimension are characterized by weak surveillance and enforcement ( 2015 ) . This indicates that contrary to the Commission claims of equality outlined above, economic considerations have taken precedence over the social dimension. Furthermore, the economic downturn precipitated by the fi nancial crisis has led to mass unemployment in many member states, increasing poverty levels and social exclusion. This kind of development could put into question the existence of the ESM. In turn, this could jeopardize the efforts at creating a European identity and the borders demarcating it. This prompts considering whether there are measures which could alleviate this danger which the Commission discourse fails to raise.
Silences in the Commission Social Dimension Discourse
This indicates the existence of potentially signifi cant silences in the Commission social dimension discourse. For one, the Commission has not proposed enforcement for the measures listed for strengthening the social dimension of the EMU (see European Commission Communication 2013a ). More generally, since the Delors era, it has not attempted to reinforce the supranational elements of the social dimension. Inevitably, these jeopardize the common EU social space, the European identity and the external borders it helps establish, in the process obstructing the transformation of identity borders.
Above all, these silences are due to the restricted Commission prerogatives in the social fi eld, which revolve around coordination (Špidla 2008 : 5) and fi ne tuning (European Commission MEMO 2009a : 2) but leave the key decisions to the member states. 7 These restrictions are compounded further by the design of the integration project itself. As Scharpf has argued, it creates a structure that disadvantages integration in the fi eld of social policy. Therefore, the absence of progress on the social dimension is not a result of agential factors, like the ideological convictions of practitioners, or due to institutional interests (Scharpf 2010 ) , emphasizing the severe limits for the Commission to engender progress on the social dimension.
Arguably, the merits of this account for the Commission silences are reinforced when one considers the lack of transfer of prerogatives to the supranational level in the social dimension in comparison to other areas affected by functional spillover, like border controls. Indeed, as one could expect, the Commission used the post-2008 situation to advocate a greater role for the EU-level in the social element of the economic governance system (Andor 2013a : 4) . So far, this has resulted in the establishment of technical competences, such as a scoreboard for employment and social indicators of the member states (Andor 2013b : 5) . As pointed out above, however, currently these measures have signifi cant weaknesses. This casts a doubt over their actual ability to reinforce the social dimension vis-à-vis economic integration. More importantly, however, the substance of such measures does not hold much promise for increasing the EU-level role. In comparison, as discussed in Chap. 2 , in the fi eld of border controls the refugee crisis led to the Commission proposals for mandatory resettlement of asylum seekers between the member states. Arguably, this is a measure with much greater potential for increasing the role of the supranational institutions, in the process also potentially accelerating the process of border transformations.
Therefore, the Commission silences on the social dimension slow down identity borders transformation, as they obstruct undertakings that could reinforce the ESM, which would strengthen the European identity and the borders underpinning it. Crucially, given the origin of such silences, it is unlikely that they can be overcome. Even if there are rare occasions when these silences on promotion of measures with a potential to strengthen the social dimension are overcome by the Commission (cf. European Commission MEMO 2013f : 3; European Commission Communication 2013a : 11; or Andor 2013e : 4), the measures it suggests do not seem to have gained traction with the other bodies involved in the EU policymaking processes. Thus, the above-discussed trends on the social dimension and their effects on borders transformation persist.
SUMMARY
This chapter has revealed that the Commission discourse on the social dimension articulates the existence of a common European space in this fi eld. In light of the crucial role played by social policy in the pro-cess of establishment of the borders characterizing the traditional order, this indicates a clear potential for border transformations. As the subsequent analysis has demonstrated, in this policy fi eld, the Commission discourse transforms identity borders. The discussion has highlighted the Commission contribution to the process of identity borders transformation through articulations affi rming the existence of an ESM and the social dimension's centrality to the integration process, as well as through enunciating a specifi c meaning for them. The last point is crucial in the context of the construction of the EU external borders, an integral part of the process of borders transformation.
As pointed out, a key characteristic of the identity borders constructed through the Commission social dimension discourse is that they are more open and fl exible in comparison to traditional ones. This is because the policies and measures establishing the EU social dimension have until now failed to produce an institution comparable in its identity-creating impact to the welfare state. Consequently, the European identity and the borders demarcating it are less anchored and more fl uid. In turn, this exposes the post-modern borders to the challenges posed by the much more fi rmly established traditional ones. As discussed this results in the reconstruction of identity borders in the EU. A key reason for such developments is the particular governance structure of the Union social dimension that severely limits the Commission's ability to promote EU-level measures that would imprint the European identity fi rmly into the population's psyche. Therefore, overall, in the social dimension, the transformation of borders can be a contradictory process that often comes about indirectly, as a result of actions undertaken in other fi elds. The plus of this situation is its potential greater openness and fl exibility, while its signifi cant downside is that it is conducive to social volatility.
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